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The Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program: A Constitutional Victory for
School Choice

I. INTRODUCTION
A recent Wisconsin Supreme Court decision gave advocates for school choice
new ammunition in the constitutional battle over government funded voucher
programs. In Jackson v. Benson,' the Wisconsin court determined that the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program2 ("MPCP") is constitutional.3 Opponents
claimed that the program violated the Establishment Clause of the Federal
4
Constitution by allowing parents to direct state monies to private religious schools.
The Wisconsin court rejected this argument and determined that the parental choice
program is consistent with Establishment Clause principles enunciated by the
Supreme Court.' Opponents of the voucher program immediately petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for review of the Wisconsin decision. The Court
denied the request for certiorari and allowed the decision of the Wisconsin court
to stand.6 The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program is thus the first voucher
program involving private religious schools to survive constitutional challenge, and
hence is a significant victory for advocates of school choice.
This Comment will focus on the impact of both the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program and its accompanying litigation on the constitutional debate over
school choice. Although the MPCP implicates many important considerations of
public policy that deserve attention, this Comment will not address these issues.
Rather, the focus will be on a single constitutional question: does the Establishment
Clause prohibit school choice initiatives which-like the MPCP-involve religious
schools?
Part I of this Comment will discuss the history of the Establishment Clause
with particular attention given to cases involving educational programs.' Part II
will introduce the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, and then focus on the

1. 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
2. WIS. STAT. § 119.23 (West 1996).
3. See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 620.
4. See id. Opponents also raised several state constitutional claims not discussed in this Comment.
See id.
5. See id.
6. See 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
7. See infra notes 10-81 and accompanying text.

constitutional analysis used by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in its decision
upholding the state voucher program.8 Finally, part III will examine the impact that
Jackson v. Benson will have in the continuing national constitutional debate over
school choice initiatives involving private religious schools.9
II. THE HISTORY AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE: ARE VOUCHER PROGRAMS INHERENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
In modem constitutional jurisprudence, cases involving the Establishment
Clause ° "have presented some of the most perplexing questions to come before
[the] Court."" Interpretation and application of the Establishment Clause have
proven to be particularly challenging in cases involving state funding of school
choice initiatives. 2 The Court has refused to draw any clear lines in this "sensitive
area" of constitutional law. 3
Despite the Court's decision to refrain from creating bright-line rules in this
area, 4 critics of school choice insist that the First Amendment proscribes all
voucher programs involving sectarian schools. 5 However, an examination of the
history and purpose of the Establishment Clause, as well as its judicial interpretation, reveals a solid constitutional foundation for state funded programs that satisfy
certain constitutional criteria.

8. See infra notes 82-142 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 143-158 and accompanying text.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion ....).
11. See Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,760 (1973); see
also, Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646,662 (1980) (suggesting
that "Establishment Clause cases are not easy; they stir deep feelings; and we are divided among
ourselves, perhaps reflecting the different views on this subject of the people of this country").
12. See J.W. PELTASON, UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITTON 121-23 (9th ed. 1982) (describing
the "especially troublesome and controversial" nature of Establishment Clause jurisprudence relating
to education); see also, Margaret A. Nero, The Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program: Why
Voucher Programs Do Not Violate the Establishment Clause, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1103, 1112 (1997)
(noting that the Establishment Clause has "generated fierce debate" concerning government funded
school choice programs involving religious schools); Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice,
The First Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 657, 659-60
(Summer 1998) (claiming that confusion over the meaning of the Establishment Clause is most apparent
in the debate over school choice).
13. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). In this landmark Establishment Clause
decision, the Court noted that it could "only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this
extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law." See id. In a later case, the Court explained that
it has chose to "sacrifice clarity and predictability for flexibility" in cases considering the role of the
Establishment Clause and government funding ofeducational programs. See Committee for Pub. Educ.
and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
14. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
15. See Suzanne H. Bauknight, The Search For ConstitutionalSchool Choice, 27 J.L. & EDUC..
525, 525 (Oct. 1998). "The most controversial proposal for school choice involves provision of statefunded vouchers to parents for payment of private school tuition." Id.
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A. Intent of the Framers
Religious freedom is central to human liberty. 6 It was with this principle in
mind that the framers of the Bill of Rights drafted the Establishment Clause. "7 The
constitutional mandate to avoid the establishment of a state-sponsored church was

not intended to prevent religion from impacting government, but rather to prevent
the religious tyranny that the colonists had fled.

8

However, in the Framers' minds,

"disestablishment was not synonymous with separation."' 9 For example, the first
Congress, which drafted and enacted the Establishment Clause, also created a

national day of prayer, instituted a military chaplain program supported by state
funds, and recognized the necessity of religion to the formation of good government.2 ° Strict separation of church and state was not intended by the framers of the
Establishment Clause,2 and, therefore, voucher programs involving religious

institutions should not be written off as inherently unconstitutional.

16. •See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 287-301 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George
Lawrence trans., Doubleday 1969) (1835). "Despotism may be able to do without faith, but freedom
cannot." Id.
17. See Viteritti, supranote 12, at 661-62 (citations omitted). Although the concept of religious
freedom varied in the early states, "[the] common element of protection throughout the thirteen
jurisdictions was a decided determination to refrain from establishing a single publicly supported
church." See id.
18. See id. The Framers intended to prevent religious tyranny without hampering the practice of
religion in America. See id. This is evidenced in part by the balance struck in the First Amendment
between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. See infra note 35 and accompanying
text.
19. See Viteritti, supranote 12, at 661-62.
20. See id. at 663-64 (citations omitted). In his dissent to McCollum v. Boardof Education, Justice
Reed relied on these examples as evidence that the Establishment Clause does not require strict
separation of church and state. See 333 U.S. 203, 253-55 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting). In addition to
these examples, Tocqueville's writings also indicate that the early understanding of the Establishment
Clause did not require a strict separation between the church and state:
[It] is just when [religion] is not speaking of freedom at all that it best teaches the Americans
the art of being free.... There is an innumerable multitude of sects in the United States. They
are all different in the worship they offer to the Creator, but all agree concerning the duties of
men to one another .... [W]hat is most important for [society] is not that all citizens should
profess the true religion but that they should profess religion ....
Religion, which never
intervenes directly in the government of American society, should therefore be considered as
the first of their political institution, for although it did not give them the taste for liberty, it
singularly facilitates their use thereof.
Tocqueville, supra note 16, at 301.
21. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952). "The First Amendment, however, does not
say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State.... Otherwise the state
and religion would be aliens to each other - hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly." Id.

B. Pre-Lemon Application of the Establishment Clause
The history of education in the United States also indicates an early understanding of the Establishment Clause that did not require separation of state funds
from religious schools. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, state monies
were sent directly to religious institutions to support their important contributions
to education in America.22 This historical relationship between the state and
religious schools was not considered violative of the Establishment Clause.
Indeed, "[n]o federal court had ever ruled, at that point in time, that it was
unconstitutional for a government agency to provide direct or indirect aid to
religious institutions."23 However, as the "common school" movement gained
momentum in the middle of the nineteenth century, the desire to separate religion
from education led to the first judicial attack on state funding of religious
institutions via the Establishment Clause.24
However, the Establishment Clause did not play a major role in the battle over
state funding of religious schools until it was made applicable to the states in
McCollum v. BoardofEducation.25 Shortly after the McCollum decision, the Court
handed down the first in a continuing series of cases addressing the applicability
of the Establishment Clause to state funding of parochial schools.26 In Everson v.
Board ofEducation,2 the Court determined that a New Jersey program reimbursing
parents for expenses incurred in bussing their children to religious schools did not
violate the constitution. 2' To explain this holding, the Court analogized the statefunded bussing program to other services, like police or fire protection, which are
made available to the public without regard to the religious affiliations of the
persons served. 29 The Court concluded that religiously neutral programs created
to benefit the general welfare do not violate the Establishment Clause.3" Everson
was a victory for proponents of religious education.
Nevertheless, Everson is frequently cited by critics of programs that lend
financial assistance to students attending religious schools as precedent precluding
such programs." These critics highlight language in Justice Black's majority
opinion describing the Establishment Clause as requiring a "high wall of separa-

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See Viteritti, supra note 12, at 664 (citation omitted).
See id.
See id. at 671.
333 U.S. at 210-11.
See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Id.
See id. at 18.
See id.
See id.
See Viteritti, supra note 12, at 705.
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tion" between church and state.32 Based on this description of the Establishment
Clause, many are quick to jump to the conclusion that the Constitution is intolerant
of any relationship whatsoever between religion and government.33 However, this

argument for strict separation is inconsistent with Justice Black's ultimate
application of this language to the facts of that case. As noted above, Justice Black
determined that the state program reimbursing parents for expenses incurred by
transporting their children to parochial schools did not breach the high wall of
separation between church and state that he had just described.34 Everson does not
require isolation of religious schools from state funds. Rather, Eversonestablished
a standard of neutrality vital to a proper understanding and application of the
Establishment Clause.35
The Establishment Clause principles articulated in Everson would continue to
guide the Court in several subsequent cases. In Zorach v. Clauson,36 the Court
determined that a state program allowing students to be released from school for
private religious instruction did not violate the Establishment Clause.37 In addition,

the Court approved a New York program allowing public schools to lend textbooks
to private religious schools in Board of Education v. Allen. 3' The Court also
reviewed a state program granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations and concluded that it did not breach the wall of separation between church

32. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1978)).
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another..... No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
...In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended
to erect a "wall of separation between church and State."
Id.
33. See Viteritti, supra note 12, at 705.
34. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. "The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and
state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach. New
Jersey has not breached it here." Id. "Moreover, the Court specifically identified attendance at a
sectarian school as a form of religious exercise protected by the First Amendment that could not be
encumbered by the state." Viteritti, supra note 12, at 706.
35. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (stating that "[The First] Amendment requires the state to be neutral
in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be
their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.");
see also, Peter M. Kimball, Comment, Opening the Door to School Choice in Wisconsin: Is Agostini
v. Felton the Key?, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 843,853 (Spring 1998) (claiming that "[In Everson] the Supreme
Court recognized an underlying principle for Establishment Clause jurisprudence: the government
action must be neutral toward religious and nonreligious groups.") (citation omitted).
36. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
37. See id. at 314-15.
38. 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968).

and state.39 These cases demonstrate the Court's willingness to accommodate some
relationships between religious organizations and the state.
C. Lemon v. Kurtzman and Related Cases
In 1971, the Court attempted to clarify its Establishment Clause analysis in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.4 ° In Lemon, the Court considered the constitutionality of
programs in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island that provided salary supplements to
private school teachers.41 After noting its difficulty in resolving Establishment
Clause questions,42 the Court determined that boundaries must be drawn to prevent
the "three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended to
afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the
sovereign in religious activity."' 43 Based upon this understanding of the Establishment Clause, the Court announced a three-prong test to be used in the analysis of
Establishment Clause issues.'
The first prong of the Lemon test requires the reviewing court to determine
whether the program at issue has a "secular legislative purpose". 4 The second
prong requires that the court analyzes the primary effect of the statute. 46 If the
statute's primary effect inhibits or advances religion, then the statute violates the
Establishment Clause.47 The third prong of the Lemon test requires an examination
of the relationship between the state and religion created by the statute.48 If the
statute fosters an "excessive entanglement" between the state and religion, the
statute is unconstitutional.4 9 The Court determined that the Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island programs satisfied the first two prongs of this analysis,50 but held the
programs unconstitutional based on the "excessive entanglement between

39. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970).
40. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
41. See id. at 606-07. The Pennsylvania statute also reimbursed private schools for expenses they
incurred in purchasing secular textbooks and instructional materials. See id.
42. See id. at 612. "The language of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is at best opaque,
particularly when compared with other portions of the Amendment." id. In its introduction to the
Establishment Clause issues presented in the case, the Court noted that "Ujudicial caveats against
entanglement must recognize that the line of separation [of church and state], far from being a 'wall,'
is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular
relationship." See id. at 614. In addition, the Court acknowledged that some relationships between
religious organizations and the state are "inevitable" and not violative of the Establishment Clause. See
id. Therefore, the argument that all programs creating relationships between the government and
religious organizations are unconstitutional is incorrect.
43. See id. at 612 (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 668).
44. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 612-13.
48. See id. at 613.
49. See id. (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).
50. See id.
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government and religion" created by the programs. 1
Although the Lemon test was intended to clarify Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, many believe that this three-prong analysis is the source of even
greater constitutional confusion.52 Nevertheless, several Establishment Clause
principles identified by the Court in Lemon must be extracted to properly identify
impermissible state programs. First, Lemon recognized that the Constitution does
not require total separation of church and state.53 In addition, the three-prong test
itself echoes the important theme of Everson: statutes that are religion-neutral
ordinarily do not violate the Establishment Clause.54 Accordingly, public programs
that benefit the "general welfare" without regard to the religious affiliations of
those being served are constitutional, unless these programs create an "excessive"
relationship between the church and state.55 Although the Lemon test has been
used to invalidate many statutes allowing state funds to reach religious institutions,
the test is not a per se rule against all programs involving religious schools.56
Two years after the Lemon decision, the Court handed down another important
Establishment Clause case involving a state program directing aid to private
religious schools. In Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist,57 the Court addressed a New York program that directed state aid to
qualifying private schools in an effort to lower maintenance and repair expenses.58
This program also established a tuition reimbursement plan and tax relief program
designed to assist parents who chose to place their children in private school.59

51. Seeid.at613-14.
52. See Kristen M. Engstrom, Comment, Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: The Souring of
Lemon and the Searchfor a New Test, 27 PAc. L.J. 121, 160 (Fall 1995). "In many critical areas of the
law, the Supreme Court has formulated distinct, identifiable criteria to use in its adjudication....
However, in recent years, the [Lemon] test used has been neither distinct, nor identifiable." Id.
(footnote omitted).
53. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614. "Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between
church and state; total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between
government and religious organizations is inevitable." Id. (citations omitted). If the Constitution were
intolerant of any relationship between the state and religious organizations, the Lemon test would not
be necessary. However, the Establishment Clause does not require such a strict separation.
54. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 613 (Wis. 1998).
55. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614-15.
56. See Bauknight, supranote 15, at 533 (noting that the Court has not accepted the argument that
all state programs involving religious schools are unconstitutional).
57. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
58. See id. at 756.
59. See id. The state program only assisted parents whose taxable income was less than five
thousand dollars. See id. The program allowed the state to send fifty dollars per elementary student and
one hundred dollars per high school student to qualifying families. See id. For families who did not
qualify for tuition reimbursement, the state allowed stipulated tax deductions for each child attending
nonpublic schools. See id. at 757.

This case presented the Court with an opportunity to apply the Lemon test.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Nyquist, began his analysis of the
Establishment Clause issues with the following statement: "Indeed, the controlling
constitutional standards have become firmly rooted and the broad contours of our
inquiry are now well defined. Our task, therefore, is to assess New York's several
forms of aid in light of principles already delineated."'
In order to make this
constitutional assessment, Justice Powell turned to the "well-defined three-part
6
test" that was announced in Lemon. 1
The Nyquist Court had little difficulty recognizing that the purpose of the New
York program was "fully secular," thus satisfying the first prong of the required
analysis. 62 However, the Court held that the program violated the "primary effect"
prong of the Lemon analysis in three ways.63 First, because the program directly
subsidized the budgets of religious institutions without significant limitations
placed on the use of state funds, the Court determined that the program had the
primary effect of advancing religion.' In addition, the Court held that the tuition
reimbursements given to parents of parochial school students also had the primary
effect of advancing religion.65 Finally, the Court determined that tax exemptions
have the same effect as tuition reimbursements and are, therefore, violative of the
Establishment Clause.66 The Court did not reach the final prong of the Lemon test
because it held the program unconstitutional based on the "primary effect" portion
of the analysis.67
A subsequent case gave the Court an opportunity to expound on this final

60. See id. at 761. Justice Powell also noted that the principles, although identified, are difficult
to extract from precedent. See id. at 757 n.5. However, Justice Powell specifically identified two
"firmly rooted" principles in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See id. at 770-7 1. First, a law may
violate the Establishment Clause without establishing an official state religion by "merely benefit[ing]
all religions alike." See id. at 771 (citations omitted). Second, a state program that indirectly benefits
a religious institution does not necessarily violate the Establishment Clause. See id. at 771-72 (citations
omitted).
61. Seeid.at772.
62. See id. at 773.
We do not question the propriety, and fully secular content, of New York's interest in
preserving a healthy and safe educational environment for all of its schoolchildren. And we
do not doubt - indeed, we fully recognize - the validity of the State's interest in promoting
pluralism and diversity among its public and nonpublic schools. Nor do we hesitate to
acknowledge the reality of its concern for an already overburdened public school system that
might suffer in the event that a significant percentage of children presently attending
nonpublic schools should abandon those schools in favor of the public schools.
Id.
63. See id. at 774-89.
64. See id. at 774.
65. See id. at 780.
66. See id. at 790-91.
67. See id. at 794. However, the Court warned that similar programs "[carry] grave potential for
entanglement in the broader sense of continuing political strife over aid to religion." See id.
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prong of the Lemon test. In Aguilar v. Felton6" the Court held unconstitutional a
New York program allowing public school teachers to teach remedial secular
subjects in sectarian schools at the expense of the state.69 The Aguilar majority
determined that the program created an unconstitutional "excessive entanglement"
by requiring "a permanent and pervasive state presence in the sectarian schools
receiving aid." 7 Based on this perceived entanglement of church and state, the
Court invalidated New York's efforts to aid in the remedial education of its
children.
Aguilar represents the highest point of the judicially constructed wall of
separation between church and state in modem constitutional jurisprudence.
Naturally, this opinion was subject to immediate criticism. Both Chief Justice
Burger and Justice White, writing separate dissenting opinions in Aguilar,warned:
"[The] Court's obsession with the criteria identified in Lemon v. Kurtzman... has
led to results that are 'contrary to the long-range interests of the country'."" In
addition, Justice Rehnquist voiced his disapproval by noting: "we have indeed
traveled far afield from the concerns which prompted the adoption of the First
Amendment when we rely on gossamer abstractions to invalidate a law which
obviously meets an entirely secular need."72 Finally, Justice O'Connor insisted that
the majority greatly exaggerated any "entanglement" the program might produce,
and suggested that the majority holding "demonstrates the flaws of a test that
condemns benign cooperation between church and state."73 This sharp criticism of
Aguilar'sholding was indicative of a growing frustration with the Lemon test and
its progeny. This frustration produced a shift in judicial perspective evidenced by
a series of cases culminating in a decision that overruled Aguilar.
D. Agostini v. Felton: A Return to Neutrality
In Agostini v. Felton,74 the Court overruled Aguilar,and held that New York's
"shared time" program, assisting in the remedial education of students attending

68. 473 U.S. 402, (1985) overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); see also School
District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) overruledby Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997) (companion case to Aguilar invalidating a similar "shared time" program).
69. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 413.
70. See id.at 412-13. The Court noted that this program would require an "ongoing inspection [of
the public school teachers] to ensure the absence of a religious message" in their remedial classes. See
id. at 412. It is primarily this inspection which the Court determined to be the source of an excessive
entanglement. See id.
71. See id. at 419 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
72. See id. at 421 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
73. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
74. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).

religious schools, did not violate the Establishment Clause.75 The Court's decision
to overrule Aguilar rested on several cases that "undermined the assumptions upon
which ... Aguilar relied."76 However, the Court was careful to note that the
"general principles" used to evaluate Establishment Clause questions had not
changed since Aguilar.77 Rather, "what has changed since ... Aguilar is our
understanding of the criteria used to assess whether aid to religion has an
impermissible effect.""5 Significantly, the Court turned away fromthe path of strict
separation and returned to Everson's theme of neutrality.79 The Court indicated
that neutrality is the key to a proper understanding of the Establishment Clause.S°

Agostini marks an important turning point in modem constitutional jurisprudence,
and it has set the stage for a final resolution to the constitutional debate surrounding state-funded voucher programs.8 '
LII. THE MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM AND SURROUNDING
LITIGATION

A. Introduction to the Milwaukee ParentalChoice Program
Like many urban public school systems across the country, Milwaukee's

75. See id. at 237.
76. See id. at 222. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, identified the following four
assumptions of Aguilar and Ball that had been undermined by subsequent decisions:
(i) any public employee who works on the premises of a religious school is presumed to
inculcate religion in her work; (ii) the presence of public employees on private school premises
creates a symbolic union between church and state;.. . (iii) any and all public aid that directly
aids the educational function of religious schools impermissibly finances religious
indoctrination, even if the aid reaches such schools as a consequence of private decision
making .... [(iv)] that New York City's Title I program necessitated an excessive government
entanglement with religion because public employees who teach on the premises must be
closely monitored to ensure that they do not inculcate religion.
See id. The Court determined that Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothillsSchool Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993), and
Whitters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), had undermined the
assumptions upon which Aguilar and Ball had rested. See id. at 226.
77. See id. "For example, we continue to ask whether the government acted with the purpose of
advancing or inhibiting religion, and the nature of that inquiry has remained largely unchanged." Id.
at 222-23 (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 223.
79. See id. at 230-31.
80. See id. The importance of neutrality in the Court's modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence
can be seen in Rosenbergerv. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). While
addressing an Establishment Clause issue presented in that case, "the Court completely ignored the
Lemon jurisprudence and relied, instead, on a pure neutrality approach." See
Bauknight, supra note 15, at 536.
81. See Kimball, supranote 35, at 871-72. "Although the Court insisted that Agostini should not
be read as a reversal of other school aid cases, it appears the Court is on the road to overturning the
tenets of Nyquist and opening the door to school choice in the United States." Id.

116
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public schools face serious problems and sharp criticism from many in that
community.82 In the early 1990s, Wisconsin's governor Tommy F. Thompson
declared that the Milwaukee public school system was a failure.83 Governor
Thompson, along with Wisconsin State Representative Annette Williams, urged
legislators to give inner-city parents a way out of this failing system. 4 The
Wisconsin legislature responded to Governor Thompson's plea by enacting the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program in April of 1990.85 The MPCP was created
to give low-income families, via state-funded vouchers, financial assistance to
enable them to send their children to the school of their choice, whether public or
private.86
The original MPCP was an experimental program which was limited in scope.
The original version of the MPCP limited eligibility to students from families
whose income did not exceed 1.75 times the federal poverty level.81 The original
program also limited the total number of students who could receive vouchers to
1.5 percent of the total student enrollment of the Milwaukee public schools. 8 In
addition, the original version of the MPCP did not allow the use of vouchers at
private sectarian schools.89 With these limitations, parents of qualifying applicants
were empowered by government vouchers to send their children to the school of
their choice.'
The MPCP proved to be very successful, and the demand from Milwaukee
residents for more assistance necessitated a significant expansion of the program.9'
To accommodate growing parental demand for access to the MPCP, the legislature
passed several amendments to the original statutes in 1995. 9" First, the limitation
on total enrollment in the MPCP was increased from 1.5 percent to 15 percent of

82. See Kristen K. Waggoner, Comment, The Milwaukee ParentalChoice Program: The First
Voucher System to Include Religious Schools, 7 REGENT U. L. REV. 165, 167-71 (1996) (detailing the
problems facing the Milwaukee public school through the 1980s and early 1990s); see also Bauknight,
supra note 15, at 525 (describing the national educational crisis that has sparked many school choice
initiatives). For a comprehensive discussion of Wisconsin's educational policy and law see Joseph A.
Ranney, "Absolute Common Ground": The FourEras ofAssimilation in Wisconsin Education Law,
1998 Wis. L. REV. 791 (1998).
83. See Waggoner, supra note 82, at 171.
84. See id.
85. See WIS. STAT. § 119.23 (West 1996).
86. See id.
87. See id. at § 119.23(a)(1).
88. See id. at § 119.23(a)(2) (West 1993).
89. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Wis. 1998).
90. See id.
91. See id. The original MPCP survived several state constitutional challenges on grounds unrelated
to this comment. See Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460 (1992).
92. See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 608-09.

Milwaukee's total public school enrollment.93 In order to accommodate this
expansion, the legislature also removed the original program's non-sectarian school
restriction.94 Parents of eligible students were now empowered to send their
children to private religious schools if they so chose.95 This modification to the
MPCP made it the first school choice program in the country to allow state funded
educational vouchers to be directed to private religious schools.96 This change also
opened the doors to an anticipated constitutional attack.
However, state legislators-anticipating the constitutional attack-attempted to
shield the amended MPCP from such attacks by enacting two modifications to the
program. First, the amended MPCP no longer sent state checks directly to
participating schools.97 Checks were instead sent, in the name of the student's
parents, to be restrictively endorsed by the parents and the school of their choice.98
In addition, the legislature included a provision in the modified MPCP that required
sectarian schools to allow participating students the option of "opting-out" of any
required religious activities of the school." These modifications indicate that the
legislature was cognizant of the constitutional challenges ahead.
Despite their attempts to shield the program, the constitutional attacks were
immediate." The Milwaukee Teachers Education Association ("MTEA"), the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP"), the
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), and a group of individual citizens filed
actions against the state in August of 1995.0 These suits alleged that the amended
MPCP violated the Establishment Clause by providing state funds to religious
schools.'0 2 Opponents of the MPCP claimed that the program directly conflicted
with the Court's holding in Nyquist. °3 In addition, opponents claimed that the
MPCP violated several provisions of the Wisconsin state constitution. 1"4 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court issued a preliminary injunction ordering the state to
withhold implementation of the amended MPCP until resolution of these claims.'l 5
Before its final resolution, the amended MPCP spent almost two years in
Wisconsin's courts. Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered accepting
original jurisdiction in the case, the justices were split on the constitutional issues

93. See WIs. STAT. § 4003 (West 1996).
94. See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 608.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See Wis. STAT. § 4003 (West 1996).
98. See id.
99. See id. at § 4008(e).
100. See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 609-10.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 614 n.9.
104. See id. at 609- 10.
105. See id. "By the time of the injunction, more than 4,000 children previously enrolled in
Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) had applied and over 3,400 had been admitted to private schools
under the amended choice program." Id. at 609 n.3.
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involved and, therefore, remanded the case to the circuit court for review."° The
circuit court granted summary judgment in the action holding that the program
violated the Wisconsin constitution. 10 7 The appellate court affirmed this
decision.l"8 Neither of the lower courts addressed Establishment Clause questions
because the case was resolved on state grounds."
However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court accepted review of the case and
overturned the holding of the lower courts." 0 Finding no state constitutional
barriers to the MPCP,"' the Wisconsin Supreme Court began the difficult task of
resolving the Establishment Clause challenge to the program. After careful review
of the MPCP and the constitutional considerations involved, the Wisconsin court
determined that the program did not violate the Establishment Clause." 2
Many assumed that the Supreme Court would accept a review of this case and
quickly correct an error in constitutional judgment. However, on November 9,
1998, the Supreme Court ended the judicial threat to the MPCP by denying the
petition for certiorari. The constitutional analysis of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's allowance of a state-funded voucher is very significant in the debate
regarding school choice. And the United States Supreme Court further elevated the
importance of this decision by its refusal to hear the case. Jackson v. Benson
represents a model of modem Establishment Clause analysis.
B. The EstablishmentClause Analysis of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
in Jackson v. Benson
Justice Donald W. Steinmetz, writing for the majority in Jackson v. Benson,
began his analysis by noting that many of the arguments presented by counsel were
not germane to the constitutional issues involved in the case. "3 He noted that most
of these arguments concerned the desirability of the MPCP and other school choice
programs as a matter of public and educational policy.' Indeed, many of the

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See Thompson v. Jackson, 546 N.W.2d 140 (1996).
See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 609.
See id.
See id.
Seeid. at620.
Seeid. at619.
See id.
Seeid. at610.
See id.
In their briefs and at oral argument, the parties presented information and testimony
expressing positions pro and con bearing on the merits of this type of school choice program.
This debate largely concerns the wisdom of the MPCP, its efficiency from an educational point
of view, and the political considerations which motivated its adoption.

"constitutional" arguments surrounding school choice seem more focused on the
wisdom of school choice as educational policy rather than the constitutional nature
of the programs. The desirability of school choice is an important issue of public
policy that deserves attention and debate. However, this debate should not take
place in the constitutional arena." 5 Rather, this debate should be left for the
legislature in order to effectuate the will of the people, unless there are legitimate
constitutional barriers. In order to address constitutional concerns, courts should
look to the history of the Establishment Clause and constitutional principles
defined by the Court in numerous cases.
With this appropriate foundation, Justice Steinmetz turned to the constitutional
principles announced in Lemon in order to determine the propriety of the
Wisconsin program.'16 The court determined that the MPCP easily satisfied the
first prong of the Lemon test, noting that "the secular purpose of the amended
MPCP, as in many Establishment Clause cases, is virtually conceded.""' 7 The
state's interest in educating children, and especially in improving the educational
opportunities of children from poor families, clearly satisfies an important secular
purpose."' Every school choice program is motivated by a desire to improve
educational opportunities for children throughout the country; this purpose clearly
satisfies the "secular purpose" principle of constitutional analysis.' Nevertheless,
the MPCP and similar school choice programs must achieve this secular goal
without offending competing constitutional principles.
As Justice Steinmetz moved into the second prong of the Lemon test-asking
whether the MPCP has a primary effect that advances or inhibits religion-he
noted that the examination of the MPCP's probable effect is a task more difficult
than examining its intended secular purpose. 0 In order to determine if the MPCP
creates this impermissible effect, Justice Steinmetz identified and applied two
important criteria in his analysis taken from precedent ranging "from Everson to
Agostini."'' These constitutional criteria are neutrality and indirection. 2 Based

Id.
115. See id. "In the absence of a constitutional violation, the desirability and efficacy of school
choice are matters to be resolved through the political process. This program may be wise or unwise,
provident or improvident from an educational or public policy viewpoint. Our individual preferences,
however, are not the constitutional standard." Id.
116. See id. However, Justice Steinmetz noted his cognizance of the Court's warnings concerning
the flexible nature of the constitutional principles defined by Lemon. See id. at 611.
117. See id. at 612 (citing Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W.2d at 407).
118. See id.
119. See Bauknight, supranote 15, at 531. "Any legislature that enacts [a voucher] program would
presumably purpose primarily to improve education for children, not provide state aid to sectarian
institutions." Id.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 617.
122. See id. at 612-13. Justice Steinmetz also identified criteria that the Court excluded from its
analysis. He noted that the Establishment Clause is not violated "every time money previously in the
possession of the state is conveyed to a religious institution." See id. (citation omitted). "The simplistic
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on these criteria, the Wisconsin court determined that "state programs that are
wholly neutral in offering educational assistance directly to citizens in a class
defined without reference to religion do not have the primary effect of advancing
religion."' 23 The court held that the MPCP did not have the primary effect of
advancing religion because state funds are awarded "on the basis of wholly neutral,
secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion."'24 Furthermore, the court
determined that the MPCP did not primarily advance religion because state funds
reach religious schools "only as a result of numerous private choices of the
individual parents of school-age children."'25 As such the court determined that the
MPCP satisfied the second prong of the constitutional analysis.'26
This determination is consistent with both the history and development of the
Establishment Clause.'27 The intended primary effect of the MPCP is improvement
in the quality of education, not the advancement of religion.2 8 The program
attempts to accomplish this secular goal by heightening parental freedom through
providing educational choices otherwise unavailable.'29 It is indeed difficult to
imagine how this attempt to maximize educational opportunities for poor families,
through increasing their ability to choose where their children will attend school,
would produce the religious tyranny the framers of the Establishment Clause hoped
to avoid.
Rather, the MPCP accomplishes the Establishment Clause's goal of state
neutrality towards religion by respecting and encouraging the educational decisions
' This program does not
of parents and allowing them to direct educational funds. 30
have the impermissible primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.' 3'

argument that every form of financial aid to church-sponsored activity violates the Religion Clauses was
rejected long ago .. " Tilton, 403 U.S. 672, 679 (1970).
123. See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 613. The Wisconsin court based this criteria on the following
language from Zobrest:
Given that a contrary rule would lead to such absurd results, we have consistently held that
government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined
without reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge just
because sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated financial benefit.
See id. (citing Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 8 (1993)).
124. See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 613.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 619.
127. See supra notes 10-81 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
129. See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 618. "'[T]he benefit [of the MPCPI neither promotes religion nor
is hostile to it. Rather, it promotes the opportunity for increased learning by those currently having the
greatest difficulty with educational achievement."' Id. (citation omitted).
130. See id. at 618-19.
131. See id. at619.

Having determined that the MPCP did not violate either the first or second
prongs of the Lemon analysis, the court moved to the next question: does the
MPCP create an "excessive governmental entanglement with religion"? 32' The

court determined that the MPCP would require the State Superintendent to monitor
and enforce "minimal standards" to insure that the participating religious schools
satisfy the state's educational requirements.33 However, the court noted that this
relationship between the State Superintendent and private religious schools already
exists pursuant to the standard educational requirements of the state.'34 The court
reasoned that "oversight activities relating to conformity with existing law do not
create excessive entanglement merely because they are part of the amended
'
MPCP's requirements."135
The court held that this pre-existing regulatory
relationship "does not approach the level of constitutionally impermissible
involvement" identified by Lemon.'36 The MPCP satisfied all three prongs of the
required constitutional analysis and the court held that on this basis it did not
violate the Establishment Clause.' 37
Opponents of the program claimed that the Court's holding in Nyquist requires
a determination that the MPCP is unconstitutional. 3
However, as Justice
Steinmetz noted, the Nyquist majority refused to determine "whether an educational
assistance program that was both neutral and indirect would survive an Establishment Clause challenge."' 39 Nyquist itself suggests that a neutral state educational
program providing economic assistance without regard to the religious affiliation

of participating students might survive constitutional scrutiny. " The MPCP is a

132. See id.
133. See id. "Participating private schools are subject to performance, reporting, and auditing
requirements, as well as to applicable nondiscrimination, health, and safety obligations." Id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 620.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 614 n.9.
Although the tuition reimbursement program in Nyquist closely parallels the amended MPCP, there are
significant distinctions. In Nyquist, each of the facets of the challenged program directed aid
exclusively to private schools and their students. The MPCP, by contrast, provides a neutral benefit to
qualifying parents of school-age children in Milwaukee Public Schools ....
The amended MPCP,
viewed in its surrounding context, merely adds religious schools to a range of pre-existing educational
choices available to MPS children. This seminal fact takes the amended MPCP out of the Nyquist
construction and places it within the framework of neutral education assistance programs.
Id.
139. See id at 614. Justice Steinmetz based this conclusion on the following section of the Nyquist
opinion:
Because of the manner in which we have resolved the tuition grant issue, we need not decide
whether the significantly religious character of the statute's beneficiaries might differentiate
the present case from a case involving some form of public assistance (e.g. scholarships) made
available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature
of the institution benefited.
Id. (citing Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n. 38).
140. See supranote 125.
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perfect fit to this mold of neutrality and indirection."' Therefore, the Wisconsin
court correctly determined that its holding should not be controlled by the Nyquist
decision. 142
Jackson correctly resolved the constitutional question left open by Nyquist and
other Establishment Clause decisions by holding that a religion-neutral program
which provides indirect economic assistance to students of private schools, without
regard to their religious affiliations, does not violate the Establishment Clause.

IV. THE IMPACT OF JACKSON V. BENSON AND THE MILWAUKEE
PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM ON THE CONTINUING ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE DEBATE

Without question, Jackson v. Benson has and will continue to impact the
debate over school choice in America.143 The immediate attention given to Jackson
in the media after it was decided by the Wisconsin court is one indication of its
importance in this debate.'" Further, the Supreme Court's recent decision to deny
review of the Wisconsin decision elevates Jackson's level of influence in the
constitutional debate over school choice.' 45 Jackson signals an important shift in
judicial perspective that removes constitutional barriers that once prevented the
expansion of educational options.146
Jackson'sinfluence in the constitutional debate over school choice can already
be seen in the decisions of other state courts addressing Establishment Clause
challenges to school choice initiatives.147 For example, the Arizona Supreme Court
recently reviewed an Establishment Clause challenge to a state program granting
a tax credit to individuals who made donations to organizations providing
educational grants and scholarships enabling students to attend private schools.' 48
The Arizona court determined that the program did not violate the principles of the

141. See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 614.
142. See id. at 614 n.9.
143. See David Schimmel, Wisconsin Supreme CourtApproves Vouchers ForParochialSchools:
An Analysis of Jackson v. Benson, 130 ED. LAW RPT. 373, 373-74 (Jan. 1999) (noting that Jackson
intensified both the political and constitutional debate over school choice).
144. See id. "[Tihe Wisconsin Supreme Court decision has publicized and intensified the voucher
debate across the country. It was, for example, a front page story and lead editorial in the New York
Times and was reported and debated in almost every major American newspaper." Id. at 386.
145. See Jackson, 119 S.Ct. 466 (1998).
146. See Perry A. Zirkel, The Right Choice?, 80 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 3, 249 (1998); see also, Kristen
K. Waggoner supra note 82, at 220. "Twenty years ago, the thought of a voucher system including
religious schools being upheld by our Supreme Court would have seemed almost impossible. Today,
not only is it possible, it is likely." Id.
147. See Kotterman v. Killian, No. CV-97-0412-5A, 1999 WL 27517 (Ariz. 1999).
148. See id. at 1; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 43-1089 (1997).

Establishment Clause, and cited Jackson as supporting authority. 49 This reliance
on Jackson exemplifies the impact and importance of this decision in the
constitutional debate surrounding school choice.
In addition, the supreme courts of three other states are currently considering
constitutional challenges to school choice initiatives. 5 ° The reasoning of Jackson
will likely influence these courts as they proceed with their own Establishment
Clause analysis. 5'
However, the impact of Jackson is not limited to courts and their review of
state programs. Rather, this decision "add[s] momentum to the voucher movement
in other state legislatures and in Congress."' 52 Because the MPCP is the first
voucher program to survive all constitutional challenges, it will be used as a model
by legislators attempting to establish new school choice programs.' Indeed, both
critics and proponents of school choice agree that Jackson will spark renewed
legislative interest in voucher programs."'
Additionally, Jackson encourages legislative action by removing the judicial
roadblocks to the political decision-making process.' 55 This judicial restraint unties
the hands of state legislators and allows them to search for unique solutions to
educational problems faced by their constituents. In fact, the judicial restraint that
allowed the MPCP to continue will enable policy-makers to evaluate the
effectiveness of a voucher program.' 56 This information will increase both the
substance and the quality of the debate over educational policy; and hopefully lead
to welcome improvements in public as well as private schools.

149. See Kotterman, 1999 WL 27517 at 6, 9. In addition to its use of Jackson as supporting
authority, the Arizona court's Establishment Clause analysis parallels the analysis in Jackson. Chief
Justice Zlaket, writing for the majority in the Arizona decision, noted that the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause decisions essentially "reflect an effort to steer a course of 'constitutional
neutrality'." See id. at 1 (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 669 (1970). The Arizona court also noted that
"[wihere assistance to religious institutions is indirect and attenuated, i.e., private individuals choose
where the funds will go, the Justices have generally been reluctant to find a constitutional impediment."
See id. at 6 (citations omitted). This reasoning is very similar to the interpretation used by the Jackson
majority in its Establishment Clause analysis: "the Court's decisions generally can be distilled to
establish an underlying theory based on neutrality and indirection." See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 613
(footnotes omitted). This similarity reflects the influence Jackson has already had in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
150. See John Biskupic, Vouchersfor Religious Schools Allowed: High CourtDeclines to Take Up
Wisconsin Case Involving Taxpayer Funds, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 10, 1998, at A2 (Ohio, Maine,
and Vermont are expected to release rulings on voucher programs within the next few months); see also,
Nero, supra note 12, at 1103 (describing the Ohio voucher program and surrounding litigation).
151. See Schimmel, supra note 143, at 373-74.
152. See id. Several other state legislatures are already considering implementing school choice
programs. See Biskupic, supra note 135, at A2.
153. See Schimmel, supranote 143, at 387.
154. See id.
155. See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 610. "In the absence of a constitutional violation, the desirability
and efficacy of school choice are matters to be resolved through the political process." Id.
156. See Waggoner, supra note 82, at 220.
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Jackson has intensified the political debate over school choice.' 57 This effect
is beneficial to both critics and advocates of school choice programs because it will
draw more legislative attention and debate to educational policies. This debate is
the key to strengthening both public and private education in our country.' 58
V. CONCLUSION
The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program is a milestone in the constitutional
debate over school choice. This program providing state-funded educational
vouchers to underprivileged children is the first in the country involving religious
schools to survive a constitutional challenge. This survival makes the Milwaukee
program a model for other state legislatures attempting to institute voucher
programs.
Although the constitutional debate over school choice has not been officially
settled by the Court, its decision to allow Jackson v. Benson to stand undercuts
assumptions that voucher programs are per se unconstitutional. Jackson signals a
retreat from ajudicially-enforced strict separation of church and state, and a return
to the governmental neutrality toward religion intended by the drafters of the First
Amendment. This understanding of the Establishment Clause will allow policymakers to choose the best educational policy for the citizens they represent; truly
a constitutional victory for school choice.

ROBERT L. MCFARLAND

157. See Schimmel, supranote 143, at 387; see also Recent Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 737, 737-42
(Jan. 1999) (criticizing Jackson as a misapplication of Establishment Clause precedent).
158. See Schimmel, supra note 143. "While most public school advocates view the Wisconsin
decision as a disaster, it ultimately could have a positive impact on public education if it serves as a
wake-up call, a call to be more sensitive to the concern of millions of religious parents who view public
schools as 'hostile to religious faith and moral values,' and if it encourages public school leaders to
work with these critics to change their perception." Id. (citation omitted).
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